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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MICHELLE DESCHAMPS, PERSONALLY
AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF THEDA E. SCHULZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Case No. 880216
vs.
LEE PULLEY, M.D. and FHP OF
UTAH, d/b/a FHP MEDICAL CENTER
OGDEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a medical malpractice/wrongful death action that
was commenced in the District Court of Weber County.

The Dis-

trict Court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
finding as a matter of law that the statute of limitations had
run on plaintiff's claim.

Appeal to this court has been timely

made pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Annotated, which
grants appellate jurisdiction in connection with judgments over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.

Whether plaintiff's medical malpractice action is

barred by the limitations statute at §78-14-4, Utah Code
Annotated.
2.

Specifically/ whether plaintiff discovered or reason-

ably should have discovered the negligence of the defendants
during the limitations period.
3.

More specifically/ the extent or degree of knowledge

that plaintiff must possess to trigger the statute of limitations.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

A determinative statute of this appeal is §78-14-4/ Utah
Code Annotated, which provides as follows:
"(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury/ whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged act/ omission/ neglect
or occurrence/ except that:
a) In an action where the allegation against
the health care provider is that a foreign object has
been wrongfully left within a patient's bodyf the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient discovers/ or
- 2 -

through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered/ the existence of the foreign object
wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever
first occurs; and
b) In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to
fradulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs,
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability
under §78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and
shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships,
associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care
providers based upon alleged personal injuries which
occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under former law could
have been commenced after the effective date of this act
may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time
allowed under former law; but any action which under
former law could have been commenced more than four years
after the effective date of this act may be commenced only
within four years after the effective date of this act".
It is only the highlighted portion of the above statute that
contains the language that is determinative.

The remaining

portions of the statute are not material to the issues on
appeal.

It is undisputed that this statute applies to wrongful

death and survival actions.

See §78-14-3(29) Utah Code Anno-

tated.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
Inasmuch as this case involves an adverse ruling from a
- 3 -

summary judgment, appellant is entitled to have the case reviewed in the light most favorable to her. Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Lucky Seven
Rodeo Corporation v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988).
Thus, for purposes of the summary judgment and this appeal, the
following facts must be considered as being true:
Plaintiff Michelle Deschamps is the surviving daughter and
personal representative of her mother Theda E. Schulz (R-l).
Defendant Dr. Lee Pulley is a practicing physician and was
employed by defendant FHP (R-l).
Between the dates of June 29, 1984 and August 1, 1984,
Mrs. Schulz was treated by Dr. Pulley and FHP for shoulder and
chest pain (R-2).

In treating this patient, Dr. Pulley pre-

scribed a regimen of drugs which induced a terminal disease
known as vasculitis! (R-3).

As a result of the drug induced

disease, Mrs. Schulz was hospitalized at St. Benedicts Hospital
on August 1, 1984, where she remained until her eventual death
on October 30, 1984 (R-4).
Prior to her death, Mrs. Schulz contacted an attorney in
Ogden, Utah, James R. Hasenyager, to look into the facts
surrounding her treatment by FHP (R-55).

1

In October, 1984

Vasculitis is a disease of the blood vessels.
See Dorland's Medical Dictionary.
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Hasenyager obtained a letter report from the University of
Utah Pharmacy Department indicating that there was little
medical literature to support drug induced vasculitis (R-49).
Hasenyager continued his investigation after the death of Mrs.
Schulz and on December 31, 1984 filed, pursuant to §78-14-8,
Utah Code Annotated, a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice
Action (R-16, 56). Hasenyager did not tell plaintiff that he
had filed a Notice of Intent and she had no knowledge of its
filing (R-46).

Thereafter, in the spring of 1985, Hasenyager

had all of the medical records reviewed by Dr. Gary Gordon of
the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine (R-46, 56).
Dr. Gordon concluded that plaintiff did not have a cause of
action (R-56).

Hasenyager then told plaintiff that he did not

believe she had a valid claim and closed his file (R-56).
Although plaintiff had received two adverse medical
reports, and her attorney had declined to go forward with her
case, she continued to feel "uneasy" about the circumstances
surrounding her mother's death (R-46).

She thereafter con-

tacted her present counsel, David A. Reeve, who agreed to
obtain a further review (R-47).

In May 1986, Reeve received a

report from Dr. Howard Ravenscraft which confirmed that the FHP
physicians had deviated from standard medical practice in the
treatment of Mrs. Schulz and their actions were indeed the
cause of her tragic and premature death (R-51).
- 5-

After receiving the report from Dr. Ravenscraft, plaintiff's new counsel (being unaware of the Notice of Intent filed
by Hasenyager) filed a new Notice of Intent on June 16, 19862
(R-20); filed a Request for Prelitigation Panel Hearing on
January 13/ 1987 (R-27); presented the matter to the Prelitigation Panel on November 2, 1987 (R-8); was notified of the
Panel's decision on November 17, 1987 (R-8); and filed the complaint in this action on January 14/ 1988 (R-l).

Plaintiff's

complaint was met by a Motion for Summary Judgment (R-28)
wherein it was alleged that the action is barred by reason of
the Statute of Limitations at §78-14-4/ Utah Code Annotated.
The Motion for Summary Judgment was heard before the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second Judicial District.
Judge Hyde granted the summary judgment reasoning that plaintiff as a matter of law knew or reasonably should have known of
her claim at the time Attorney Hasenyager filed the Notice of
Intent on December 31/ 1984.

That being so, Judge Hyde con-

cluded that the filing of the complaint on January 14/ 1988 was
beyond the 2 year limitations period (R-86).

2 Because of a possible defect in the elapsed time between
the Notice of Intent and the Request for Prelitigation Panel
Hearing/ and using an abundance of caution, counsel filed a
second Notice of Intent on January 13/ 1987 along with the
Request for Prelitigation Panel Hearing. This is not material
to the issues on appeal.
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It is plaintiff's position in this action that she made
reasonable efforts to discover her claim and that she did not
know, nor could she have reasonably known, of the negligence or
the causation until May 1986 when she obtained the opinions of
Dr. Ravenscraft.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff's argument on appeal may be summarized as
follows:
1.

§78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, authorizes the filing

of a malpractice action within two years after the plaintiff
"discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury".
2.

Utah authorities have held that discovery of the

"injury" means discovery of the negligence which resulted in
the injury.
3.

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

A mere suspicion of negligence does not trigger the

statute of limitations.
4.

Whether or not plaintiff discovered or reasonably

should have discovered the negligence is a fact question.
5.

The fact that plaintiff's prior attorney filed a

Notice of Intention to Commence Malpractice Action without her
knowledge, and later concluded from his investigation that her
- 7 -

case was not meritorious and closed his file, is not an absolute event that would irrevocably activate the state of limitations.

At best, this is a fact to be considered with all other

facts in determining plaintiff's conduct and knowledge,
6.

The trial court committed manifest error in holding

that the statute of limitations had run as a matter of law,

ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED AS THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE UNTIL MAY OF 1986
Clearly the leading Utah case on the "discovery rule" is
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) 3 where the
plaintiff did not learn of the defendant doctor's negligence
until 3h years after it occurred.

The knowledge came as a

result of a report from an Industrial Commission medical panel.
In a scholarly and exhaustive opinion this court squarely held
"that the two year provision does not commence to run until the
injured person knew or should have known that he sustained an
injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action".
Thus, the court stated:
"Accordingly we hold that the term discovery of
"injury" in §78-14-4 means discovery of injury
and the negligence which resulted in the injury".
3

See also Christensen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435
(1968).
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In making the above ruling, the court reasoned a) that there is
a great disparity of knowledge between those who provide health
care services and those who receive themf and laymen simply are
unequipped to diagnose the cause and effect of certain ailments, b) that knowledge of the negligence ought to be required
in order to prevent the premature filing of unfounded claims,
c) that anything less than full knowledge might tempt some
health care providers to not make full disclosure to their
patients, or even suppress the truth, d) that the maximum 4
year limitation period is reasonably short and adequately
guards against difficulty in defending stale claims, and e)
that a further safeguard against tardy claims is the requirement of exercising reasonable diligence.

All of these consid-

erations, and more, are present in the instant case.

Some of

the more compelling arguments are as follows:
1.

Discouraging the Filing of Unmeritorious Claims. In

Foil, the court makes the following statement:
"The law ought not to be construed to destroy a
right of action before a person even becomes aware
of the existence of that right".
The above also might logically be rephrased to state that the
law ought not to be construed to compel an injured party to
file an action before his attorney could ethically or legally
do so.
- 9 -

Rule 11/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as
follows:
"The signature of an attorney (to a complaint)
... constitutes a certificate by him that
(the complaint) is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law...
If a (complaint) is signed in violation of this
rule, the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party ... reasonable expenses ...
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Not not only does Rule 11 prohibit an attorney from filing
unwarranted complaints, but this court has also adopted a
strong position against the filing of appeals where there is no
reasonable factual or legal basis for the appeal.

Rule 33(a)

and 40(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court; Brigham City v. Mantua
Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1988) (attorney's fees and double
costs awarded for unwarranted appeal).4

The policy of the

law is and rightfully has been to discourage unfounded claims.
In light of this policy it is untenable to argue that Hasenyager should have proceeded with an action that he simply could
not file without violating his responsibilites as an officer of
the court.
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel, after making a
diligent effort, didn't learn of any facts to justify

4

The Court of Appeals has also adopted the same policy.
Rule 40(a) Rules of Utah Court of Appeals; O'Brien v. Rush, 744
P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987).
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proceeding with the action.

To now adopt respondent's position

is to adopt a policy that would compel or encourage the
premature filing of malpractice actions.

If there is any type

of suit that ought to be discouraged/ it is a suit against a
professional where his reputation and practice might be
adversely effected by even a nonmeritorious suit.

These suits

are expensive to defend and often involve significant emotional
impact upon the defendant.

Indeed, as pointed out in Foily one

of the chief purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
was to prevent the filing of unjustified lawsuits against
health care providers.

Lawyers are under constant criticism

from professional organizations and others because of alleged
unfounded suits.

Responsible plaintiff's Bar organizations

such as ATLA and UTLA repeatedly admonish their members not to
file unmeritorious suits.

If there is anything the legal

community doesn't need in this day and age of tort reform it is
a policy of law that gives credibility to trigger happy
plaintiff's lawyers.

Plaintiff and her attorney James

Hasenyager ought to be commended/ not punished/ for their
exercise of restraint where they "suspected" negligence but
could not after due diligence discover any facts to confirm
their suspicions and to justify the filing of an action.
2.

The Effect of Filing a Notice of Intent.

But for the

fact that plaintiff's counsel filed a Notice of Intent to
Commence Malpractice Action/ there is little doubt that her
- 11 -

action would not have been dismissed.

Yet there is no reason

why this single fact should become so absolutely determinative,
especially where plaintiff had no knowledge of the filing and
where counsel himself could not discover any facts to justify
proceeding further.
The effect of the trial court's ruling is to create out of
thin air a new test, unsupported by statutory or case authority, to start the statute running.
to do this.

The trial court is not free

The critical test is whether plaintiff had know-

ledge of "the negligence that resulted in the injury" not
whether her counsel filed a notice.
After everything else is said and done, the real issue in
this case is whether a subjective suspicion of negligence on
the part of the plaintiff constitutes knowledge.

If it does,

then the trial court was correct in its ruling.

But if that is

the law it runs directly opposite to the philosophy of Foil v.
Ballinger, supra, and flies in the teeth of virtually every
principle and consideration given as a reason for that decision.
One could not seriously and in good conscience urge that
lawsuits ought to be encouraged where there is but a "suspicion" of negligence.

Suspicion is not knowledge of negligence.

It is urged by the plaintiff that the knowledge required to
start the statute of limitations ought to be a knowledge of
facts that would lead a reasonable prudent person to believe
- 12 -

that he had a cause of action.

In a malpractice case, the

facts of negligence would almost always focus on the professional standard of care and whether there had been a deviation
from the standard.

In the instant case, such facts came to

light in May 1986.

Until that time, neither plaintiff nor her

counsel had anything beyond a bare suspicion.
3.

No Serious Danger of Stale Claims.

In fashioning a

correct principle of law the court should not lose sight of the
purpose of statutes of limitation generally —

namely, to guard

against the difficulty of proof created by the passing of time.
In Utah, virtually all other negligence actions are covered by the 4 year statute of limitations at §78-12-25. This
statute has worked well and without controversy for decades
since the time of its passage.

The health care profession,

through its powerful legislative lobby, has been successful in
getting special legislation to shorten medical negligence
claims to 2 years from the date of discovery.

But the same

statute places a maximum time of 4 years from the date of the
alleged act which is the same period that has historically been
considered reasonable for everyone else.5

Thus, there could

never be any legitimate danger from a stale claim.
For purposes of this appeal, it must be accepted as true
that the defendants negligently killed Mrs. Schulz and now
5

See Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) holding
that the 4 year provision operates as a statute of repose.
- 13 -

raise the statute of limitations as a technical defense.

Under

these circumstances, there is no reason for the court to adopt
an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute**.
4.

Other Foil Considerations.

In holding that discovery

of "injury" means discovery of the negligence which resulted in
the injury, the court in Foil v. Ballinger, supra, also emphasized that a different rule might discourage health care providers from candidly telling their patients of their mistakes
in hopes that the statute of limitations might run before the
patients are fully advised.

The court noted that this would be

an undesirable objective as "the law should foster a fulfillment of the duty to disclose so that proper remedial measures
can be taken and damages ameliorated".
Another requirement under §78-14-4 is the duty of the
plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence in determining the
negligence and cause of her injury.

This requirement adds

another factor to discourage the bringing of late claim©.
In addition, the entire picture must be viewed in the
light of the tremendous disadvantage that any layman has of
understanding medical implications, medical standards, medical

6

This court has held that §78-14-4, the subject statute,
should be construed in a harmonious manner to promote justice
by precluding it from becoming a procedural trap for the
unwary. Forbes v. St. Marks Hospital, 754 P.2d 933 (Utah
1987).
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alternatives and the effects of medical treatment.

Especially

is this important in a case such as this where we are dealing
with a rare disease that isn't entirely understood even by
physicians.

These factors weight heavily in favor of adopting

a reasonably liberal discovery rule.
All three of the above considerations apply every bit as
much to the facts here as they do to the facts of Foil.
5.

Other Utah Authorities.

Respondents in the lower

court succesfully cited the case of Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d
694 (Utah 1980) in support of their motion for summary judgment.

Hove does not represent any departure from Foil v.

Ballinger and in fact supports the position of the appellant.
In Hove/ the lower court, after a full trial of the facts,
found that the plaintiff had knowledge of her injury more than
two years before she filed the action.

Plaintiff was a pro-

fessional nurse with medical experience and the trial court
found that she either knew or resonably should have known of
the defendant's negligence.

On appeal, the Supreme Court

affirmed the ruling pointing out that the issue was not whether
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known, but whether the
trial court could have so found on the basis of the evidence
that was presented.

The findings of the lower court were sus-

tained, but obviously the same evidence could have supported
opposite findings if the court had believed the plaintiff.
- 15 -

The

court cited Foil as authority for the proposition that knowledge is a fact question.
the instant case and Hove.

There is a big difference between
In Hove, the case was reviewed with

all facts to be considered in the light most favorable to the
lower court's findings.

Here all facts must be considered in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff has not

as yet been given the luxury of a trial and is entitled to her
day in court as was Barbara Hove.
An unfortunate and troublesome part of the Hove decision
is the language on page 696 stating that the plaintiff there
could have been expected to have recognized the possibility
that the recurring discomforts were the result of the alleged
negligent injection.

The word "possibility" was picked up in a

later federal case? and was also used by Judge Hyde as a
standard wherein he held that plaintiff need only know of the
possibility of negligence in order to activate the statute of
limitations (R-87).

This obviously needs to be clarified by

the court, as there are three possible meanings to the use of
this language in Hove.
1.

They are:

The word "possible" could have been used inocuously or

7 See Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp 152 (D. Utah 1984).
In Hargett, Judge Winder listed the elements as 1) the existence of any injury, 2) its cause, and 3) the possibility of
negligence. There the cause was known, but plaintiff believed
the negligence would be difficult to prove. In the instant
case, plaintiff not only had no facts to show negligence but
she had no facts to establish causation until May of 1986.
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inadvertently merely in the sense to confirm the fact that the
trial court had made an actual finding of knowledge or imputed
knowledge on the part of plaintiff.

If this is the case, the

language is taken entirely out of context by the respondent and
by the lower court.

Plaintiff believes this to be the most

logical explanation for the language.
2.

It also could mean that the plaintiff in a malpractice

action must know of some fact to confirm the possibility of
negligence.

If this is the case, the trial court still would

have committed error because here the plaintiff didn't know of
a single fact to confirm even the possibility of negligence
until May 1986.

Nor did she know of any fact to confirm the

cause of the disease.
3.

It could also mean that a suspicion of negligence

satisfies the statute since anything is "possible"**.

if this

is the case, then Foil v. Ballinger is emasculated and plaintiff loses this appeal.

For the reasons argued in pages 8 thru

16 of this brief, plaintiff does not believe this alternative
to be a proper interpretation of the statute.
Another case relied upon by the respondents is Magoc v.
Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986) wherein the statute of
limitations was deemed to have commenced when plaintiff's

8 This is the position that was successfuly argued to the
trial court by the respondent (R-73).
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counsel sent a demand letter to the defendant describing the
claim.

That case likewise is not in point as it was admitted

there that plaintiff knew of the malpractice but just didn't
know the full extent thereof9.

In any event, Magoc isn't

binding upon this court; the Utah Supreme Court doesn't need
help from a federal court to interpret its own opinions.

CONCLUSION

Prior to May, 1986, plaintiff in this action had nothing
mare than a subjective suspicion of defendant's malpractice.
suspicion is not knowledge.

A

This court should not adopt a rule

that would promote the filing of lawsuits against professionals
based upon mere suspicions.

There are other adequate safe-

guards that protect against the filing of stale claims.
Plaintiff's knowledge is a fact question.

The degree of

knowledge necessary to trigger the statute of limitations ought
to be a knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent
person to believe that he or she had a cause of action.

Plain-

tiff ought to be entitled to present her evidence on this issue
to the trier of facts.
It is respectfully urged that the summary judgment in this

9

See also Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp 781
(D. Utah 1987) .
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case be reversed and that plaintiff's action be reinstated in
the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
David E. West
David A Reeve
1300 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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